The End of Chevron: How Loper Bright Changes the Face of American Administrative Law

In June 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling on executive powers— and its not the presidential immunity case – but rather one that overturned the Reagan-era precedent of Chevron deference. The decision marks a major shift, limiting agency authority and empowering the judiciary to take a more active role in interpreting and enforcing federal laws, altering the balance of power in the executive branch.

What is ‘Chevron Deference’?

Chevron deference, established in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), arose when the NRDC challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act, arguing it was too lenient on polluters. The EPA argued that the law was ambiguous and allowed them to treat multiple sources of pollution at one facility as a single source. The Supreme Court sided with the EPA, creating Chevron deference, which requires courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes when Congress has not provided clear guidance. [1]

Chevron deference follows a two-step framework. First, courts determine if Congress explicitly addressed the issue; if so, the agency must follow that directive. If the statute is “silent or ambiguous” [2] courts defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation, even if they might prefer a different approach. As NRDC counsel David Doniger noted, “If Congress has left an agency with a policy choice, the agency should get to make it, not the courts.” [3]

Rooted in the belief that agencies, with their expertise, are better suited than courts to make policy decisions, Chevron has become a cornerstone of administrative law, cited by federal courts over 18,000 times. [4]

The Case that Overturned Chevron: Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024)

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned Chevron, reshaping crucial aspects of administrative law. The case involved the National Marine Fisheries Service requiring fishing boat operators to fund onboard observers under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Lower courts upheld the rule under Chevron, but the Supreme Court, in a 6-3 ruling, rejected this, holding that courts must determine the best reading of a statute rather than defer to agency interpretations.

Chief Justice Roberts affirmed that the judiciary has the sole authority to “say what the law is,” [5] arguing that Chevron deference contradicts the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires courts to apply their own judgment when interpreting statutes. He rejected the notion that agencies are better suited to resolve ambiguities, even on technical issues, and deemed Chevron “unworkable.”[6] Justice Gorsuch added that the ruling “places a tombstone on Chevron no one can miss,” restoring the courts' interpretive role without agency bias. [7]

Implications of Loper Bright

The Loper Bright ruling significantly reshapes regulatory practices by stripping administrative agencies of powers they held under Chevron. Without Chevron deference, courts will scrutinise agency interpretations more rigorously, likely leading to more legal challenges. While agencies may still rely on the weaker Skidmore doctrine, which grants deference based on the persuasiveness of their reasoning, [8] judicial oversight will be heightened.

However, in the long term, Loper Bright may push Congress to draft clearer laws, reducing agency power and expanding the judiciary’s role in regulatory policy. As Chief Justice Roberts noted, “If it is not the best [reading], it is not permissible.”[9] This shift could lead to more expert input and explicit delegations to agencies, theoretically resulting in better-quality laws.

The most profound consequence of Loper Bright is the shift in power from federal agencies to the judiciary. By removing deference to agency interpretations, the Court significantly expands the judiciary’s role in statutory interpretation, making judges the final arbiters of ambiguous laws. The Chevron doctrine had previously acknowledged that Congress often "explicitly leaves gaps for agencies to fill," [10] a key aspect of effective governance. This raises concerns about whether courts, lacking agencies' specialised expertise, can effectively manage complex regulatory matters.

Justice Elena Kagan, in her firm dissent, warned that the ruling turns the judiciary into “the country’s administrative czar,” [11] granting judges sweeping authority over every open issue “no matter how expertise-driven or policy-laden.” [12] She argued this approach disrupts the balance between branches of government, as judges are not accountable to the public in the way that elected officials and agency experts are.

The Loper Bright decision marks a pivotal moment in the evolution of American administrative law, shifting interpretive power from federal agencies to the judiciary. While this may lead to more precise and transparent statutory guidance from Congress, it also raises concerns about whether courts, without the specialised expertise of agencies, can effectively navigate complex regulatory issues. The ruling's long-term impact on governance and the balance of power between branches remains uncertain, but it undeniably alters the framework for interpreting federal laws. As agencies adapt to this new reality, the future of regulatory enforcement and policy-making will face heightened scrutiny and legal challenges.

[1] Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).

[2] Loper Bright, Nos. 22–451 and 22–1219, 603 U.S. ____ (2024), slip op. at 14 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).

[3] Jeff Turrentine, ‘What Happens if the Supreme Court Ends Chevron Deference?’ (NRDC, June 2024) https://www.nrdc.org/stories/what-happens-if-supreme-court-ends-chevron-deference accessed 21 October 2024.

[4] Amy Howe, ‘Supreme Court Strikes Down Chevron, Curtailing Power of Federal Agencies’ (SCOTUSblog, June 2024) https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/06/supreme-court-strikes-down-chevron-curtailing-power-of-federal-agencies/ accessed 20 October 2024.

[5] Roberts, C.J., quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), Loper Bright (n 2), slip op. at 8.

[6] Roberts, C.J., Loper Bright (n 2), slip op. at 30.

[7] Gorsuch, J., concurring, Loper Bright (n 2), slip op. at 2.

[8] Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

[9] Roberts, C.J., Loper Bright (n 2), slip op. at 23 n.2.

[10] Chevron (n 1), 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

[11] Kagan, J., dissenting, Loper Bright (n 2), slip op. at 32.

[12] Ibid.