London Bridge: a tragedy that could have been avoided?
On 29th November, London was tragically struck by yet another terrorist attack. Police named Usman Khan, who had previously been jailed for terrorism offences, and was wearing a GPS police tag, as the terrorist who took the lives of 2 people, Jack Merritt and Saskia Jones. Stories of heroism followed, as video footage shows ordinary members of the public jumping to neutralise the threat, armed with a narwhal tusk and a fire extinguisher, before police shot and killed Khan, who was strapped with a fake suicide bomb vest. With Khan known to the police, released from prison on licence in December 2018, there has been continual debate as to whether this tragedy could have in fact been prevented. Mr Johnson, in the aftermath of the attack proclaimed “I have long argued that it is a mistake to let serious and violent criminals out of prison early and it is very important that we get out of that habit and that we enforce the appropriate sentences for dangerous criminals, especially for terrorists that the public want to see.” Is this a clear Conservative commitment to a reformation of the law in order to “toughen up sentences”. This blog post will aim to set out the current legal framework under which Khan was released.
On 31st January 2012, Khan was sentenced under section 5(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006, an offence of engaging in preparation for acts of terrorism. Deemed to have a “serious long term attitude to establishing, funding and securing British Muslims, Khan was sentenced as a dangerous offender to detention for public protection with a minimum custodial term of 8 years.
The minimum term was half of the equivalent sentence, providing Khan could satisfy a Parole Board that longer imprisonment was no longer necessary. The complicated edge to his release seemed from successive government changes. In 2012, prisoners serving Extended Sentences were released automatically at the halfway stage of their custodial term, thereby avoiding the Parole Board. An explanation for this change was the spiralling prison population, and the saving of government money. Under the coalition government, the concept of no Parole Board oversight continued, except for the most dangerous of dangerous offenders.
With Priti Patel blaming Yvette Cooper for the Labour governments reformation of terrorist sentencing to allow for automatic release, which was a lie. In the eyes of the Secret Barrister, Khan’s sentence was that the Court of Appeal ruled (to be proved tragically wrong) that Khan’s risk did not require the input of the Parole Board that an Imprisonment of Public Prosecution would have guaranteed.
In this sense, the focus and obsession with attributing blame to existing legal framework seems the exact politicisation of a tragedy which David Merritt, father of the late Jack Merritt, pleaded politicians not to do. Focus should instead turn to prison spacing, and funding for the legal system, which would free up the burden on Parole Board to exercise a crucial public function.
