Brexit: a constitutional crisis

Yesterday, in one of the most important parliamentary votes of our democratic era, May’s Brexit deal came crashing down after the largest defeats in history with a majority of 230 votes against. Subsequently, as is constitutional convention after such a disastrous defeat, Corbyn, leader of the Opposition, issued a motion of no confidence which concluded with the House voting that the Government retains political confidence with a small majority of 19 votes.

This result consolidates the constitutional narrative of Parliamentary Sovereignty that the Government have attempted to bypass throughout the Brexit process, originating with Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting European Union in which the Government attempted to trigger Article 50 through use of prerogative powers and omit the parliamentary process. May’s administration has yet again been unable to conquer Parliamentary Sovereignty. However, whilst this may indicate constitutional crisis prima facie, it also demonstrates the successful mechanisms of the political system through the refusal to allow the Government to construct a mediocre solution to a monumental problem, in favour for the most suitable outcome for the electorate. Thus, although it appears that the entire political system is in turmoil, the constitutional notion of Parliamentary Sovereignty is operating as determined, ensuring a thorough and accountable Executive that adheres to the desires of the electorate.